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I. INTRODUCTION
There was a time when state districting cases were half as difficult as
they are now. That was so because the United States Supreme Court
applied the protections granted under the Constitution's Equal Protec-
tion Clause only one way-in favor of minority interests. In the eyes of
the Court, there was a method to this madness, for it was minorities,
not the white majority, who were the objects of overt and covert dis-
crimination in all forms and in every aspect of life. Thus, the Court
stood on high moral ground in declaring that the rights of the power-
less would not be trampled upon. Yet, while the Constitution is a moral
document, it is also a color-blind one. In Miller v. Johnson,2 the Court
determined that certain forms of race-based districting, the carving of
legislative boundaries to create majority-minority districts,3 are invidi-
ous to the right to vote as an equal member of society and to equal
protection under the laws.' In so doing, the Court nudged the focus of
justice toward a more color-blind view.
This Note analyzes the Court's decision in Miller and its implications
on redistricting, the rights of minorities, and federal government policy.
1. This Note uses the term "districting" in reference to the manner by which
voting districts are drawn. The terms "districting," "redistricting," "apportionment," and
.reapportionment" are often used interchangeably. Charles Backstrom et al., Issues in
Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to
Minnesota, 62 INN. L Rnv. 1121, 1121 n.1 (1978); Bernard Grofman, Criteria for
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 78 n.6 (1985).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
3. Majority-minority voting districts are defined as "districts in which a majority
of the population is a member of a specific minority group." Voinovich v. Quilter, 507
U.S. 146, 149 (1993).
4. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
1317
Part II examines the development of the Court's strict scrutiny standard
and its entanglement in state redistricting.' The facts of the Miller case
are discussed in Part III,' followed by an analysis of the majority opin-
ion, the concurring opinion, and the two dissenting opinions in Part
IV.7 In Part V, this Note considers the impact this decision will have on
the judiciary, as well as its impact on American society.8 Part VI con-
cludes with a brief summation of the decision's importance.9
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.""0 Under conventional analysis, governmental
decision making is presumptively valid." As a result, when state action
is challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the standard
of review is very deferential, requiring only that the state action be ra-
tionally related to achieving a legitimate state interest.2 When a state
discriminates according to a "suspect" classification," however, the
Court will strictly scrutinize its action and require that the state's in-
terest be "'compelling"' and the means used to further this interest be
"'narrowly tailored.". 4 The Court has long deemed classifications
based on race inherently suspect, thus requiring this type of strict scru-
tiny analysis."
5. See infra notes 10-130 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 143-220 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 221-313 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
12. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-62 & n.6 (1981).
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that a law barring inter-
racial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause, in part because it was based on
a suspect classification-race). Under this analysis, the targeted state action is con-
sidered "presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justifica-
tion." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (noting that state action premised upon racial clas-
sification is "presumptively invidious").
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109 (1995) (quoting
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)).
15. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1995); see, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at
11-12 (noting that the Court has "consistently denied the constitutionality of measures
which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (recognizing that a classification based on race must be
viewed as "constitutionally suspect"); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943) (recognizing that "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ances-
try are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
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A. The Development of Strict Scrutiny Analysis in
Racial Classifications
Much of the logic used in Miller had its roots in the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.6 In Brown, black students denied entry
into the segregated South's white schools petitioned the Court to deseg-
regate the school system and allow black and white children to be
taught together. 7 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held the segrega-
tion unconstitutional, reasoning that the "detrimental effect" of segre-
gation harmed not simply the black conununity, but society as a
whole.' Following Brown, the Court determined that racial classifica-
tions were "inherently unequal," and therefore subjected these classifi-
cations to strict scrutiny, creating a new cause of action. 9 Yet, for a
period of time, the strict scrutiny standard was reserved solely for the
historical victims of discrimination-minorities. °
upon the doctrine of equality" and that "racial discriminations are in most circum-
stances irrelevant and therefore prohibited."). The only time the Court has upheld
explicit racial discrimination under a strict scrutiny analysis was in upholding a law
excluding American citizens of Japanese descent from certain West Coast areas.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. Id. at 487-88.
18. Id. at 494-95.
19. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE CouRT 105-06 (1993). The Court never
adequately explained the reasoning behind the rule. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 213, 256 (1991). Nevertheless,
the rule itself is very clear. the mere allegation that a person was classified by race
constitutes a claim. Id. at 255-56.
20. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1969) (holding invalid a
municipal ordinance that prohibited a city council from taking measures to eliminate
racial discrimination in housing absent a referendum); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 482 (1954) (invalidating state action that systematically prohibited Hispanics from
participating on juries); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (declaring the
systematic discrimination against Chinese laundry operators unconstitutional). In his
treatise on constitutional law, Professor Laurence Tribe argued that "the device of
strict scrutiny is most powerfully employed for the examination of political outcomes
challenged as injurious to those groups in society which have occupied, as a conse-
quence of widespread, insistent prejudice against them, the position of perennial los-
ers in the political struggle." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-
6, at 1453-54 (2d ed. 1988). In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court noted: "[The
Fourteenth Amendment] was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of
all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to
that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it
should be denied by the States." 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
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The first major case where the Court claimed that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause protected whites as well as blacks was Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.' In Bakke, the University of California
at Davis Medical School rejected an applicant to its program purely be-
cause of a racial quota system that the University used in its admissions
process." In this affirmative action23 case, the plurality noted that
race-based classifications are subject to "stringent examination"24 and
the Court's "'most rigid scrutiny.'"25 The plurality found that the medi-
cal school failed to show that its race-based admissions program was
created to respond to identified discrimination.2" As a result, the Court
held that the school did not prove a compelling governmental interest
to satisfy strict scrutiny review.
2 7
Eight years later, the Court decided the first in a series of cases that
would greatly expand upon the application of the Equal Protection
Clause to non-minority groups. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion," a school board responded to NAACP complaints by hiring mi-
nority teachers.' The school board and the Jackson Education Associ-
ation approved the addition of a layoff provision to their collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) that protected minorities from layoffs."
Thereafter, when the board needed to institute layoffs, "nonminority
teachers were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 276-78.
23. Affirmative action programs are defined as "je]mployment programs required by
federal statutes and regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in hiring
minority group members; i.e., positive steps designed to eliminate existing and contin-
uing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create
systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59
(6th ed. 1990).
24. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
25. Id. at 291 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
26. Id. at 309. Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, noted: "We have never ap-
proved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized
groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307.
27. Id. at 319. Justice Powell stated:
The purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical
School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who
bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special ad-
missions program are thought to have suffered.
Id. at 310.
28. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 297-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 270.
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retained."3' Although there was no majority opinion, five justices held
that the school board's action was unconstitutional. 2 The plurality be-
lieved that strict scrutiny was appropriate because of the racial classifi-
cation in the CBA, reasoning that the standard of review should not
change solely because the classification at issue burdened a class of
people who were not the traditional victims of discrimination.' Be-
cause the school board's actions were not narrowly tailored, the plurali-
ty concluded that the layoff plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause.'
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,35 the Court invalidated a
race-conscious affirmative action program that reserved a percentage of
city construction projects solely for minority-owned construction com-
panies. 6 The Court held that a strict scrutiny analysis applies even to
classifications designed to benefit minority groups. 7 Further, the Court
suggested that its decision extended beyond affirmative action cases by
holding that any race-based governmental action must undergo strict
scrutiny.' Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, asserted three rea-
sons for requiring that affirmative action plans undergo strict scruti-
ny-' First, she stressed the difficulty in determining whether a racial
classification is "'benign'" or "'remedial"' or whether it is actually "mo-
tivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial poli-
tics."" Because of this difficulty, Justice O'Connor argued that strict
31. Id. at 272.
32. Id. at 283-84; id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. Id. at 273-74.
34. Id. at 283-84. Justice Powell noted that the "Court never has held that societal
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification." Id. at 274.
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 511.
37. Id. at 493-94. The Court noted that "the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification," and thus there is but one standard of review-strict scrutiny.
Id. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986).
38. Id. at 493-94.
39. Id. at 493-95.
40. Id. at 493. In his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
Justice Thomas wrote:
It should be obvious that every racial classification helps, in a narrow sense,
some races and hurts others. As to the races benefited, the classification
could surely be called "benign." Accordingly, whether a law relying on racial
taxonomy is "benign" or "malign,". . . either turns on whose ox is gored ...
scrutiny is necessary to "'smoke out'" possible illegitimate uses of clas-
sifications.4" Second, she argued that the "stigmatic" harm often caused
by race-based classifications may actually hurt the group the classifica-
tion intended to benefit because they foster the idea that the favored
group is less competent and inferior than the unfavored group.42 Final-
ly, Justice O'Connor argued that strict scrutiny is necessary to achieve
true race neutrality.43
Applying strict scrutiny to the contract reservations plan, the Court
found the plan wanting.44 The Court noted there was no evidence pre-
sented that anyone in the City of Richmond had ever discriminated
against minorities in awarding construction projects.4" As a result, the
Court found no compelling interest for the City's action.46 Further, the
Court concluded that the means used were not narrowly tailored be-
cause Richmond failed not only to use any race-neutral methods aimed
at opening up the construction market to minorities, but also to show
that such an attempt would be futile.47
The Supreme Court later limited its holding in Croson to state ac-
tion.' For congressional action, the Court used a lower standard of
review-the "intermediate standard."49 This distinction did not last
long, with the Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'
applying strict scrutiny across the board to state and congressional
action alike.5 In Adarand, a division of the United States Department
or on distinctions found only in the eye of the beholder.
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 n.* (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (internal citations omitted).
41. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
42. Id. at 493-94 (citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
298 (1978)). Justice O'Connor applied the same reasoning in the reapportionment con-
text. See infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 495.
44. Id. at 511.
45. Id. at 498-506.
46. Id. at 506.
47. Id. at 507-08.
48. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), overnded by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
49. Id. The Court in Metro Broadcasting held that
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those mea-
sures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissi-
ble to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.
Id.
50. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
51. Id. at 2113.
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of Transportation awarded a gravel and construction company with a
contract for the construction of a highway. 2 The company sought to
subcontract a portion of the job to a smaller company.' In conformity
with federal law, the government placed a clause in the main
contractor's agreement that provided additional monies if it subcon-
tracted with a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE).' Federal
regulations define a DBE as a small business, a majority of which is
owned and managed by disadvantaged individuals-predominantly mi-
norities." While Adarand Constructors submitted the lowest bid, the
company was denied the job because it did not qualify as a DBE.'
Adarand filed suit, claiming that race-based subcontracting clauses
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment." The
Court agreed, and moved the level of scrutiny for federal actions that
discriminate on the basis of race from the intermediate standard of
review to the strict scrutiny approach. 8
B. The Reapportionment Cases
Most of the Supreme Court cases that concern race-based legislative
districting have dealt with vote dilution claims, where legislators "gerry-
mandered""9 districts in an effort to minimize the voting power of a
particular group.' The Supreme Court has viewed vote dilution as an
unconstitutional abridgment of the right to vote, holding that "[t]he
52. Id. at 2102.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2103-04.
55. 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 (1995). There is a rebuttable presumption that "women, Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, [and]
Asian-Indian Americans" are disadvantaged individuals. Id.
56. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
57. Id. at 2104. For purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review, an
analysis under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments is identical. Id. at 2112-13.
58. Id. at 2113.
59. Gerrymandering is defined as "the process of dividing a state or other territory
into the authorized civil or political divisions, but with such a geographical arrange-
ment as to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose, as, for instance, to secure a
majority for a given political party in districts where the result would be otherwise if
they were divided according to obvious natural lines." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 23, at 687.
60. See infra note 96 (explaining the vote dilution standard).
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right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by
an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."6
One of the earliest apportionment cases was Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,62 where the town of Tuskegee, Alabama, drafted a redistrict-
ing plan that excluded almost every black voter without excluding any
white voters.' Interpreting Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Court held the plan unconstitutional because it effectively denied blacks
the right to be heard in the voting process.' While the Court used the
Fifteenth Amendment as the basis for its decision, the concurring opin-
ion reasoned that the redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifteenth Amend-
ment because of the plan's unlawful separation of individuals according
to race.'
Following GomiUion, the Court decided the landmark case of Baker
v. Carr.' It is argued that Baker "launched the modem era of voting
rights jurisprudence."7 In Baker, a state legislature had gone sixty
years without reapportioning its districts.' As a result of population
movements during that time, some districts had vastly greater numbers
61. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
62. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
63. Id. at 341.
64. Id. at 342. The Court in Shaw v. Reno later stated that "Gomit/ion . . . sup-
ports [the] contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separat-
ing voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regard-
less of the motivations underlying their adoption." 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993).
65. Gomi//ion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). Justice Whittaker rea-
soned that because blacks in the area still retained the right to vote, though outside
of the city boundaries, it could not be a Fifteenth Amendment violation. Id.
(Whittaker, J., concurring). The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Justice Whittaker's
view. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (citing
Gomillion in support of the proposition that racial classifications are presumptively
invalid); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (citing Gomillion to support
the contention that the Court has not hesitated to strike down infringements of Four-
teenth Amendment rights).
66. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
67. Alexander A. Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting
Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L REV. 1810, 1815 (1992); see also Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88-89 (1966) (holding that properly apportioned multimember districts can
violate the Equal Protection Clause if it can be shown "[they] operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion"); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (upholding the constitutionality of
multimember districts in general); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964)
(holding that legislators must not venture too far from the concept of one-man, one-
vote in the way they apportion their districts); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379
(1963) (prohibiting states from diluting votes on the basis of race under the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments).
68. Baker, 369 U.S. at 191.
1324
[Vol. 23: 1317, 1996] Miller v. Johnson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of voters thus diluting the votes of those from larger districts.' The
Court found that a legislature's reapportionment plan is a justiciable
issue for the courts and invalidated the scheme."0 On the heels of Bak-
er, the Court decided Wright v. Rockefeller,7' and extended the holding
of Gomillion to congressional districting.72 In Wright, a minority group
alleged that one of New York's four congressional districts was appor-
tioned to exclude nonwhites from the district.73 While the Court ruled
against the plaintiffs,' it was unanimous in its belief that the allegation
the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" was
a valid constitutional claim.75 The only disagreement was whether the
plaintiffs adequately proved their case.76 Following Baker and Wright,
the Court faced a number of cases involving multimember redistricting
schemes. The Court held many of the schemes violated the Fourteenth
Amendment when enacted with both a discriminatory intent and a vote
diluting effect.77 Nonetheless, by the 1970s, the Court had lessened its
scrutiny of state reapportionment plans having a negative impact on mi-
norities.8
69. Id. at 193-94. In the course of those 60 years, the voting age population of
Tennessee had increased four fold. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 237.
71. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
72. Id. at 58.
73. Id. at 53-54.
74. Id. at 56-58.
75. Id. at 56; id. at 58 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 59-62 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
76. Id. at 56-58; id. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court noted that two equal-
ly valid inferences arose from the plan, one that involved racial discrimination and
another that did not. Id. at 56-57. The plaintiffs failed to prove that only one was
valid. Id. Foreshadowing the Court's decision in Miller, Justice Douglas noted that
segregating voters by race promotes polarized voting. Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
77. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1969) (holding that states
are required to "make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality" in
drawing Congressional districts); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967) (holding a
state redistricting scheme invalid because it substantially deviated from population
equality).
78. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323 (1973) (holding that in the inter-
est of "the normal functioning of state and local governments," states have more
leeway in drawing state legislative districts than in drawing congressional districts);
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (recognizing "that minor deviations
from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make
out a prima facie case" of unconstitutionality); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185
(1971) (holding that where a redistricting plan is "justified by legitimate state consid-
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In 1976, the Court in Beer v. United States79 directly addressed the
criteria a state must satisfy under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to
successfully attack claims that its redistricting plan has the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote based on race.' ° In Beer, the City
of New Orleans challenged the United States Justice Department, which
rejected the city's reapportionment plan on the grounds that the plan
failed to maximize black political representation.8 While the Court
noted that the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to do away with
racial discrimination in the voting process,' it recognized that the
"purpose of [section 51 has always been to insure that no voting-proce-
dure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise."' The Court held that an increase in minority
representation is not required under the Voting Rights Act, only the
development of voting procedures fair to minorities.' The dissent ar-
gued that the Act requires minorities be given the opportunity to
achieve representation in accordance with their numbers.' In the
erations," population equality is not strictly required); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971) (recognizing that without evidence of intent to limit minority voting pow-
er, the Court cannot invalidate a plan based solely on impact). In order for a cov-
ered jurisdiction to make a change to its voting system, it would have to show under
the Voting Rights Act that the proposal does "not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
79. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
80. Id. at 141. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act imposes "stringent new remedies
for voting discrimination in . . . covered jurisdictions." James F. Blumstein, Defining
and Proving Race Discrimination. Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Resuits Approach
from the Voting Rights Act, 69 U. VA. L. REV. 633, 677 (1983). The term "covered ju-
risdiction" refers to any state which has a history of systematic exclusion of minori-
ties from the electoral process. Id. at 680-88 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)). In
those jurisdictions, any alteration in a "standard practice, or procedure with respect
to voting" must be pre-approved by the United States Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 679 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)). Its
purpose was "to insure that old devices for disenfranchisement [would] not . . . be
replaced by new ones." S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182.
81. Beer, 425 U.S. at 136-37. Notwithstanding the fact that there was a district with
a significant black population, "[nlo Negro was elected to the New Orleans City
Council during the decade from 1960 to 1970." Id. at 135.
82. Id. at 140.
83. Id. at 141. Nevertheless, the burden of proving that "the plan has neither the
purpose, nor the effect, of 'abridging the right to vote on account of race or color'"
rests with the state. Robert A. Blake, A Step Toward a Colorblind Society: Shaw v.
Reno, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937, 951 (1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
84. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. The Court reaffirmed this principle in City of Lockhart
v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
85. Beer, 425 U.S. at 143 (White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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Court's next Term, Justice White, who wrote for the dissent in Beer,
wrote for the majority in the Court's next reapportionment case, United
Jewish Organizations of Wiliamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey.'
In United Jewish Organizations, members of a Hasidic Jewish com-
munity in New York claimed that the state violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by splitting the community into two districts in an effort to
create majority-minority districts in compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.' The Court held that a state may affirmatively use race as a "spe-
cific remedy for past unconstitutional apportionments."' Thus, racial
considerations could be used to increase minority representation, but
could not be used to reduce the size of nonwhite voting blocks.' As
long as white voters as a group were fairly represented, individual
white voters could not claim a constitutional violation.' In a dissent
that sounded like the Miller majority, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The result reached by the Court today in the name of the Voting Rights Act is
ironic. The use of a mathematical formula tends to sustain the existence of ghet-
tos by promoting the notion that political clout is to be gained or maintained by
marshaling particular racial, ethnic, or religious groups in enclaves. It suggests to
the voter that only a candidate of the same race, religion, or ethnic origin can
properly represent that voter's interest, and that such [a] candidate can be elected
only from a district with a sufficient minority concentration. The device employed
by the State of New York and endorsed by the Court today, moves us one step
farther away from... [an] American "melting pot.""
In Thornburg v. Gingles,' the Court had its first opportunity to inter-
pret the recently amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' As a re-
86. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
87. Id. at 155.
88. Id. at 161. Justice White, writing for the plurality, asserted that "neither the
Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using ra-
cial factors in districting and apportionment." Id.
89. Id,
90. Id at 16668. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, raised doubts concerning the expansive views sup-
porting remedial racial classifications propounded by the Court in United Jewish
Organizations, and thus limited the decision to gerrymandering cases. 438 U.S. 265,
305 (1978). This limitation expressed a reluctance among the Justices at that time to
use racial considerations as a remedial measure. Bradley D. Whine, Note, Can You
Get to Kings County from Interstate 85? A Reevaluation of United Jewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey in Light of Shaw v. Reno, 19 VT. L REV. 843, 861 (1995).
91. United Jewish Org., 430 U.S. at 186-87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
93. Prior to 1982, § 2 was little more than a preamble to the Voting Rights Act.
Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes From a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 925
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sult of the 1980 census, North Carolina drafted a new districting
scheme.94 Members of the black community challenged the redistricting
scheme on the grounds that it impaired their ability, through the use of
multimember districts, to elect representatives of their choice.90 In re-
solving this vote dilution claim, the Court interpreted section 2 as requir-
ing that a totality of the circumstances test be used in determining
whether the rights of a protected class to participate in the political sys-
tem are violated.' Under the specific facts at issue in Thornburg, the
Court held that the use of muitimember districts did violate section 2."
Less than two decades after United Jewish Organizations, the Court
began moving away from that precedent with Shaw v. Reno.98 The Shaw
Court faced a fact pattern somewhat similar to that in Miller. After the
1990 census, North Carolina was allocated an additional congressional
seat.' Under the Voting Rights Act, North Carolina was required to sub-
mit any new redistricting plan to the Justice Department for approv-
al."0 The North Carolina legislature drew up a plan that created one
majority-minority district.' This plan was rejected by the Justice De-
(1995). Section 2 was given greater meaning in 1982, prohibiting the application of
any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or proce-
dure . . . which results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on ac-
count of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). As the statute dictates, a viola-
tion occurs when members of one racial group "have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988). Notwithstanding its later
interpretation, the 1982 congressional debates on the amendment to § 2 assured Con-
gress that the preclearance provision of § 5 would not be applicable to § 2, and,
thus, that the Department of Justice could not use it to demand the creation of ma-
jority-minority districts. Thernstrom, supra, at 925.
94. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 34-35.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 48-50. To prove vote dilution, a plaintiff must first show that the minori-
ty group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a single-member district." Id. at 50. Second, it must be shown that the group is "po-
litically cohesive." Id. at 51. Finally, one plaintiff must prove that "the white majority
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it .. .usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate." Id. In Growe v. Emison, the Court applied the principles of Thornburg to
single member districts, noting that "[i]t would be peculiar to conclude that a vote-
dilution challenge to the (more dangerous) multimember district requires a higher
threshold showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a single member district."
113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993).
97. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 80. The Court noted that the state's black population
was "sufficiently large and contiguous to constitute effective voting majorities in sin-
gle-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the multimember districts."
Id. at 38.
98. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
99. Id. at 2819.
100. Id. at 2820.
101. Id. at 2819.
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partment on the grounds that a second majority-minority district could
have been created.' °2 As a result, North Carolina redrafted its plan in
accordance with the Department's wishes, and created two majority-mi-
nority districts."° A group of residents sued, arguing that the new plan
classified citizens according to race and thus was unconstitutional.' 4 In
granting certiorari, the Court limited the appeal to the following question:
Whether a state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act and the
Attorney General's interpretation thereof precludes a finding that the legislature's
congressional redistricting plan was adopted with invidious discriminatory intent
where the legislature did not accede to the plan suggested by the Attorney Gener-
al but instead developed its own." '
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, was careful to note that this
was not a vote dilution claim,"°6 but instead one that dealt with "the
deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of
race."0 7 By her analysis, the two are "analytically distinct," for whereas
vote dilution claims implicate the relative voting power of a group to
which the plaintiff belongs, the issue in Shaw was one of governmentally
imposed racial classifications in the context of voting."'~ The dissent
criticized this distinction, noting that the Court in United Jewish Organi-
zations was aware of the Fourteenth Amendment claim that eventually
prevailed in Shaw, but that the argument "did not carry the day for peti-
102. Id. at 2819-20.
103. Id. at 2820.
104. Id.
105. Shaw v. Barr, 506 U.S. 1019, 1019 (1992).
106. In a vote dilution claim, the question is "whether a particular group has been
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process."
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986). Thus, plaintiffs would have to "prove
both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group." Id. at 127. Unconstitutional discriminatory effect
.occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole." Id. at 132.
107. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. Under the kind of conventional race discrimination
approach advocated by Justice O'Connor, plaintiffs would be required only to estab-
lish an intentional race-based classification or disadvantage to trigger a strict scrutiny
analysis. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (noting that racial
classifications trigger strict scrutiny).
108. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829. This distinction is critical for if Shaw were deemed
a vote dilution claim, then the policy of stare decisis would dictate an alternate out-
come. See James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v.
Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 540-48 (1995).
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tioners. '" °9 Regardless, the Court asserted that "[liaws that explicitly
distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of'
the Equal Protection Clause." ° Accordingly, the Court noted that when
government action is blatantly race-based, strict scrutiny applies."'
Thus, the government would have to show a compelling state interest
and prove that the law is narrowly tailored to meet that state inter-
est."2 In effect, the Constitution must be color-blind." 3 The Court,
finding the "bizarre" shape of the district clear proof that racial consider-
ations prevailed over normal districting considerations, applied strict
scrutiny and declared the action an unconstitutional infringement of the
Equal Protection Clause."4 The Court noted that its judgment "ex-
press[ed] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-
minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection
claim," and held only that based on the facts before them, the plaintiffs
had a cause of action. "5 Thus, while it was clear after Shaw that bi-
zarre districts trigger strict scrutiny, the Court provided little guidance
109. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2824. It has been argued that "[mlethodologically, one can view both
Shaw and Bakke as rejecting a categorical, rule oriented form of legal decision for a
more contextualized, standard-based approach." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-Dis-
trict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483, 504 (1993).
111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. Strict scrutiny was applied in Shaw not because of
an infringement of the fundamental right to vote, but because race is a suspect clas-
sification, and it was alleged the district was drawn on the basis of race. Blumstein,
supra note 102, at 527. Professor John Ely has argued against that general idea, con-
tending that "regardless of whether it is wise or unwise, it is not 'suspect' in a con-
stitutional sense for a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself." John H.
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cln. L. REV. 723,
727 (1974).
112. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825.
113. Id. at 2824. Shaw v. Reno was not the first Supreme Court case to refer to a
"color-blind Constitution." See id. In Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan wrote in a
dissent: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens .... The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his sur-
roundings or of his color . . . ." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
115. Id. This left some commentators to wonder whether Shaw would have any
judicial impact. See Stanley A. Haplin, Jr., Waves and Backwashes in Voting Rights
Law: Recognition Without Implementation of a New Principle Opposing Gerryman-
dering, 22 S.U. L. REv. 255, 261 (1995) (asserting that Shaw may be remembered
only as "a moral statement in support of color-blind districting"). Another commenta-
tor noted: "Justice O'Connor's opinion is remarkable for its studied avoidance of legal
propositions! It is, in every sense, a deeply funny opinion: in saying nothing whatev-
er, it speaks volumes about the Court's squeamishness on [q]uotas." Matthew Horan,
Shaw v. Reno: Will It Turn Out Like Koresh v. Reno?, ARK. LAw., Spring 1994, at 31.
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for the lower courts in determining the level at which racial consider-
ations become suspect."6
In Johnson v. DeGrandy,"' a minority group challenged the configu-
ration of Florida's legislative districts as malapportioned."8 As a result
of these complaints, the state legislature enacted a new redistricting
scheme."9 The plaintiffs amended their complaint, alleging a violation
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.20 The legislative plan at issue in-
tentionally created more than nine predominantly Hispanic House dis-
tricts. '2 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argued that eleven such districts
could have been created without adverse impact to other groups.'22 The
Court held, as it had in Beer, that such "maximization" of the minority
vote was not required under the Voting Rights Act. 23 It reasoned that
no violation existed because "minority voters form effective voting major-
ities in a number of districts roughly proportional to the minority voters'
respective shares in the voting age population."2 ' Yet, the Court did not
disturb those intentionally created race-based districts already in exis-
tence, causing some to argue that "[t]he clear implication of this [opin-
ion] is that race driven majority-minority districts are not per se invalid
after Shaw."2 '
In United States v. Hays,'26 decided the same day as Miller, white
residents in a majority-minority district filed suit, claiming that
"Louisiana's congressional redistricting plan [was] a racial gerrymander
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."'27
116. Blake, supra note 83, at 956. To some extent, Miller seemed designed to fill
this gap left open in Shaw.
117. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
118. Id. at 2651-52.
119. Id. at 2652.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2653.
123. Id. at 2659.
124. Id. at 2651.
125. Halpin, supra note 115, at 263. Shaw was' not cited in the majority's opinion;
however, Justice Kennedy, in a separate concurrence, noted that the issue of whether
majority-minority districts were per se invalid was not before the Court. DeGrandy,
114 S. Ct. at 2667 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Foreshadowing his majority opinion in
Miller, Justice Kennedy argued that Shaw causes government officials and courts to
.recognize that explicit race-based districting embarks us on a most dangerous
course." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
127. Id. at 2432. Twelve of the fifteen parishes within the district were split, as
In the course of litigation, the Louisiana legislature redrafted its
districting scheme, and in doing so, dissolved the district in which the
plaintiffs lived." Under the new plan, the plaintiffs' homes were re-
moved from the majority-minority district.'29 The Court ruled that be-
cause plaintiffs did not live in the district they claimed was racially gerry-
mandered and failed to prove that they had been the subject of a racial
classification, they lacked standing on which to sue.'3 °
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
For nearly three decades, the Justice Department has, pursuant to its
interpretation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, required Georgia to obtain
prior administrative or judicial approval of any change to its legislative
districting.'" Because of the 1990 census results, Georgia was entitled
to an eleventh congressional seat.'32 Georgia had only one district with
a majority-black population, thus in the interest of fairness, Georgia's
General Assembly redrew the State's congressional districts so as to
create another majority-black district for the new seat.'" Even with
these changes, the General Assembly's plan was rejected by the Depart-
ment of Justice because the Department claimed that Georgia failed to
explain why it did not create a third majority-black district.'" As a re-
sult, Georgia created a new plan, which increased the black population
in a third district and thus allowed a strong minority influence.'35 Again,
the Justice Department rejected the plan, relying on the ACLU's "max-
black" plan as proof that a third majority-minority district could have
well as four of the State's seven largest cities. Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119,
121 (W.D. La. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). The district court noted that the
contours of the district could "only be explained credibly as the product of race-con-
scious decisionmaking." Id. at 122.
128. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2432. Injury from discriminatory governmental actions "accords a basis
for standing only to 'those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the
challenged discriminatory conduct.'" Id. at 2435 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
755 (1984)). Nonetheless, the Court also noted that "[any citizen able to demonstrate
that he or she, personally, has been injured by that kind of racial classification has
standing to challenge the classification in federal court." Id. at 2436.
131. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995). Judicial approval must be by
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2483-84. The Justice Department argued that because the black popula-
tion was 27% of Georgia's general population, the two majority-minority districts cre-
ated by the Georgia legislature, which allocated only an 18% share of the districts to
majority-minority populations, were inadequate. Id. at 2483.
135. Id. at 2484.
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been created." The Georgia General Assembly finally relented and de-
signed a third majority-black district, the Eleventh District, by clumping
together black neighborhoods from Atlanta, Savannah, and outlying ar-
eas, creating a district that spanned 200 miles and in some areas was
only as wide as the highway.'37 Elections were held in accordance with
the newly approved districting plan and black candidates won in all three
majority-black districts.'"
Five white voters from the gerrymandered Eleventh District filed an
action against various state officials, claiming that the state action violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 A dis-
trict court panel agreed and held the districting invalid.4 ° The court de-
termined that racial considerations were the "overriding and predominant
force" in creating the districts and applied strict scrutiny.'4 ' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, approaching it
with an eye toward defining Shaw v. Reno,'43 decided two terms pri-
or.'" The Shaw Court held that "redistricting legislation that is so bi-
zarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race'...
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2485.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 113 S. CL 2816 (1993).
144. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined in
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. at 2482. Justice O'Connor also wrote a con-
curring opinion. Id. at 2497.
Because the shape of the district at issue in Miller was less dramatic than the
North Carolina district at issue in Shaw, the Miller Court could not simply apply
Shaw; it had to either expand the decision or retreat from it. Charles Fried,
Foreward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13, 64 (1995). Harvard Law Professor and
Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Charles Fried noted three options available to
the Court in Miller. (1) to limit Shaw to the particular facts of the case; (2) to re-
verse itself, overturn Shaw, and "admit that the whole enterprise" was "miscon-
ceived"; or (3) apply the principles underlying Shaw to the new case. Id. The Miller
Court chose the last option. Id.
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demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that clas-
sify citizens by race.""' Justice Kennedy's opinion, while recognizing
that a state's redistricting plan could be voided if it failed to pass Shaw's
bizarreness test, stood for the proposition that it could also be voided
where race "predominated" in the state's decision making.'46
Justice Kennedy relied on Shaw to distinguish this claim from the vote
dilution cases. He drew a distinction between cases where a state acts
"'to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities'"'47 and cases where a state is "separating voters into dis-
tricts."'48 Reminiscent of the Court's discussion in Shaw, Justice Kenne-
dy noted that the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to ensure
racial neutrality in governmental decision making.'40 He noted that
"'[riacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.'"'"4 Justice Kenne-
145. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977))) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 2487.
147. Id. at 2485-86 (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980)). Because ma-
jority-minority districts are never 100% minority, proponents of race-based districting
argue that such districts are "among the least segregated ...in the nation." Brief for
the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Hays v. Louisiana, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1995) (Nos. 94-558, 94-627). This argument is deceptive. White voters are
included in majority-minority districts not out of some sense of integration, but sim-
ply as "filler people" to prevent minority votes from being wasted. T. Alexander
Aleinkoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional
Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 630-31 (1993). Whites that find
themselves in majority-minority districts "should not be expected to compete in any
genuine sense for electoral representation in [those districts,] lest they undo the pref-
erence given to the specified minority group." Id. at 631. Voting rights scholar Abigail
Thernstrom noted: "Whites who think of running in a majority-black constituency are
informed in no uncertain terms that the color of their skin disqualifies them; they are
treading where they do not belong." Thernstrom, supra note 93, at 918.
148. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
149. Id. at 2482. The Shaw Court noted that the central purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is "to prevent the states from purposefully discriminating between indi-
viduals on the basis of race." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). Yet, others argue that race consciousness is a prerequisite
to true equality. Justice Blackmun noted almost two decades earlier. "In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in
order to treat persons equally, we must treat them differently." Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). The Court has recognized "that in order to remedy the effects of
prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account." Wygant v. Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (plurality opinion).
150. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291); see also Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification, regardless
of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an ex-
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dy declared that the doctrine of racial neutrality must be applied equally,
without respect to whether a burden is placed on the minority or wheth-
er the majority accepts a burden upon itself.5 ' Government cannot fa-
vor groups because the Constitution recognizes only individuals. 2 As a
result, laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld un-
less they pass the Court's strict scrutiny test-narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest." Justice Kennedy observed that
traordinary justification.").
151. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097, 2110 (1995) ("[The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited."); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.
Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991) ("It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legiti-
mate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree."); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 ,(1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies regardless of "the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 ("The guarantee of equal protec-
tion cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color."). But cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 307 (1879) (arguing that post-Civil War Amendments were intended to bar dis-
crimination against blacks).
152. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486. As early as 1967, the Court invalidated a law against
interracial marriage not because of its effect on a particular group, but because of its
effect on individuals of either race who sought to intermarry. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 2 (1967). Justice O'Connor, in her Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC dissent,
argued: "At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the sim-
ple command that the government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.'" 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annu-
ity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)), overruled
by Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Justice Ginsburg later disagreed, noting that the pro-
cess of redistricting inherently treats voters as groups, not as individuals. Miller, 115
S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Rather than assigning voters based on "merit
or achievement," as an employer would, voters are classified into groups, whether by
economic, geographical, political, or social classification, and the interests of each
group are balanced against the other. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Marcia
Coyle, The Court's New View: Colorblind Rulings Put Heavy Burden on Racial Clas-
sifications, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at Al ("[C]ivil rights law is based on group
protections .. . . 'Brown v. Board of Education was filed not simply to get Linda
Brown into public school but to desegregate public schools.'" (quoting voting rights
scholar and litigator Frank R. Parker of the District of Colombia Law School)).
153. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114; Shaw, 113 S.
Ct. at 2825; Croson, 488 U.S. at 494; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 280 n.6. Critics argue
that if it is the race-based classification itself which causes the injury, then the
Court's opinion in United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), decided the same
day as Miller, in which the Court found plaintiffs lacked standing, seems wrongly
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such a rule has been applied where the state attempts to racially discrim-
inate in access to its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and
schools. "
The premise of Shaw was that "'laws that explicitly distinguish be-
tween individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of [the Equal
Protection Clause's] prohibition.""5 Justice Kennedy argued that this
prohibition extends beyond clear-cut racial discrimination, and applies to
state action neutral on its face but "'unexplainable on grounds other than
race. ' ' 5 He maintained that Shaw was not intended to suggest that "a
district must be bizarre on its face before there is a constitutional viola-
tion.""'57 He reasoned that because Shaw recognized that where a dis-
trict is not so bizarre, proof of an Equal Protection Clause violation will
be more difficult, one can logically conclude that other evidence besides
a district's bizarreness may be taken into account." Justice Kennedy
argued, "Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary ele-
ment of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof,
but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its
own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's domi-
nant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines."'59
decided. The Supreme Court 1994 Term-Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 109
HARv. L REV. 160, 167 (1995) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. They argue that an indi-
vidual would be subject to the same racial classification whether he was excluded
from, or included in, a district because of his race. Id.
154. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing New Orleans C'ty Park Improvement Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (schools)). In his dissent, Justice Stevens distinguished these cases
from the facts in Miller, noting that the Court's prior cases sought to remedy the
exclusion of blacks from white-only public facilities. Id. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Furthermore, race was not a qualification for living in the Eleventh District of
Georgia. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted: "What respondents contest
is the inclusion of too many black voters in the District as drawn. In my view, if re-
spondents allege no vote dilution that inclusion can cause them no conceivable inju-
ry." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824) (brackets in orig-
inal).
156. Id. at 2483 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825) (quoting Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 262, 266 (1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
157. Id. at 2486.
158. Id. at 2487 (citing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826).
159. Id. at 2486. Prior to Miller, the lower courts were split on whether to recog-
nize evidence other than bizarreness in establishing an Equal Protection Clause viola-
tion. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 431 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (noting that the bizarre
shape of a district is constitutionally significant "only as circumstantial evidence that
the disproportionate concentration of members of a particular race in certain districts
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In determining the proof necessary to sustain an equal protection chal-
lenge, Justice Kennedy distinguished simple awareness of racial demo-
graphics from the predominance of race in the redistricting process."6
He noted that states will almost always take race into account in draw-
ing their districts, but that does not necessarily mean that race has pre-
dominated in the process. 6 ' He maintained that it is the plaintiffs bur-
den to show, through either bizarreness in a district's shape or direct
evidence of a legislature's intent, that the legislature was predominantly
motivated by race in drawing its districts.'62 A plaintiff makes this
showing by proving that traditional districting principles, such as "com-
pactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests," were less important to the legislature
was something the line-drawers deliberately set about to accomplish"); Hays v. Louisi-
ana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994) (holding
that gerrymandering may also be proved by "direct evidence that a legislature enact-
ed a districting plan with the specific intent of segregating citizens into voting dis-
tricts based on their race"); but see DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (noting that a redistricting plan is invalid under Shaw only if it is "so
dramatically irregular that [it] can only be explained as [an] attempt[] to segregate by
[race]").
160. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
161. Id. at 2488. A good explanation of racial predominance can be found in Per-
sonnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). The Feeney Court wrote that
"discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as aware-
ness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its ad-
verse effects. . . . " Id. at 279 (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy recognized that
this may be a difficult distinction to make, and thus believed courts should be very
careful in adjudicating claimed violations of the Equal Protection Clause through race7
based districting. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
162. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. The Court earlier wrote in Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle that the Equal Protection Clause is violated
when race is a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the state's decision making. 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977). For Justice Ginsburg, legislative intent alone would not be suffi-
cient proof-in her Miller dissent, she noted that in United Jewish Org. of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, "[f]ive justices specifically agreed that the intentional
creation of majority-minority districts does not give rise to an equal protection claim,
absent proof that the districting diluted the majority's voting strength." Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2506 n.1l (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977)).
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in drawing its districts than were racial considerations. 3 Absent that
showing, a state's good faith will be presumed.'
After examining Georgia's redistricting plan, Justice Kennedy could
offer no "predominant factor" other than race for the shape of the voting
district." He noted that no community of actual shared interests could
have existed in the Eleventh District, which he claimed told a "tale of
disparity, not community"'" because of its "fractured political, social,
and economic interests."'67 He reasoned that the predominance of race
in the district's design was apparent when the shape of the district was
viewed together with its "racial and population densities."'" The Court
declined to decide whether the combination of shape and population
density alone was sufficient to prove the predominance of racial motiva-
tion in the state's districting process, because the district court was pro-
vided with direct evidence of racial predominance.'" This direct evi-
dence was provided by the Justice Department's refusal to approve
Georgia's redistricting plan unless more majority-minority districts were
created, as well as Georgia's acquiescence to that demand.'7" Justice
163. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court noted that where race-
neutral districting considerations are the basis for the legislature's districting plans, a
state can "defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines." 113
S. Ct 2816, 2827 (1993).
164. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488. This presumption is born out of the discomfort the
Court feels toward involving itself in state redistricting, which it considers essentially
a state function. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct 1149, 1156-57 (1993) (noting that
reapportionment is the domain of the states, and not the federal courts); Growe v.
Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1993) ("[Tlhe Constitution leaves with the States pri-
mary responsibility for apportionment."); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)
("[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State. ... );
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-796 (1973) ("Districting inevitably has sharp po-
litical impact and inevitably political decisions must be made by those charged with
the task.").
165. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489 (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1374-78
(S.D. Ga. 1994), af'd, 115 S. CL 2475 (1995)).
166. Id. at 2484 (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1376-77, 1389-90 (S.D.
Ga. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)).
167. Id. at 2488. The district court noted that "[t]he populations of the Eleventh
[District] are centered around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that have
absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch the district hundreds of miles
across rural counties and narrow swamp corridors." Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1389.
The Almanac of American Politics refers to the Eleventh District as a "monstrosity."
MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN PoLrIcs 356 (1994).
168. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
169. Id. (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1364, 1378, 1389-90 (S.D. Ga. 1994),
qffd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)).
170. Id. (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1364, 1366, (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd,
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)). The Attorney General of Georgia strongly objected to the De-
partment of Justice's demand that three majority-minority districts be created because
the only way to comply would "violate all reasonable standards of compactness and
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Kennedy noted that the United States Attorney General "would accept
nothing less than abject surrender to its maximization agenda."' 7'
Once Justice Kennedy established race as the predominant factor in
drawing the district, he applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to
the redistricting plan. To prevail under this standard, the state must
show that its plan is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling inter-
est." 3 While the Court found a strong state interest in eliminating the
effects of past discrimination,'7" it recognized that Georgia's true objec-
tive was to satisfy the demands of the Department of Justice.7  The
Court reasoned that complying with the demands of the Justice Depart-
ment, independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination,
could not provide the compelling interest necessary to survive strict
scrutiny.'76 Justice Kennedy noted further: "When a state governmental
entity seeks to justify race-based remedies to cure the effects of past
discrimination, we do not accept the government's mere assertion that
the remedial action is required. Rather, we insist on a strong basis in
evidence of the harm being remedied."'77 He reasoned that blind defer-
contiguity." Id. at 2489-90.
171. Id. at 2489 (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1364, 1360-67, (S.D. Ga.
1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)). Justice Department officials told Georgia legisla-
tors at a Washington meeting "to subordinate their economic and political concerns
to the quest for racial percentages." Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1364, 1364 n.8
(S.D. Ga. 1994), affid, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
172. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
173. Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829-32 (1993)); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 & n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion).
174. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
175. Id. (citing Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1378). Justice Ginsburg disputed that asser-
tion in her dissent. She argued that while the Justice Department dictated a plan to
Georgia's General Assembly, that was not the final plan enacted. Id. at 2504
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1396-97 n.5 (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting)). Further, Georgia had options other than to change its redistricting plan.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The state could have filed a civil action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking relief from the Justice
Department's demands. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490-91.
177. Id. at 2491; see also Shaw v. Reno 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993) (noting that
only three justices on the Court have ever contended that "[s]tates have a significant
interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the require-
ments of the Voting Rights Act"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 ("The history of racial
classifications in this country suggests that blind deference to legislative or executive
pronouncement of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.").
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ence to the Justice Department's objection would result in a "surrender[]
to the Executive Branch [of] our role in enforcing the constitutional
limits on race-based official action."' Justice Kennedy further deduced
that Georgia's districting plan was not required by the Voting Rights
Act.9 He cited the district court's finding that the Justice Department
had operated under a "black-maximization" policy,"u and stated: "Wher-
ever a plan is 'ameliorative,' a term ... used to describe plans increasing
the number of majority-minority districts, it 'cannot violate [section five
of the Voting Rights Act] unless the new apportionment itself so dis-
criminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitu-
tion.'" 8' Thus, the Act's "non-regression" principle simply dictates that
so long as a state's redistricting does not put minorities in a worse posi-
178. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. The Shaw Court wrote that "the Voting Rights Act
and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies section five
[of the Voting Rights Act] may still be enjoined as unconstitutional." Shaw, 113. S.
Ct. at 2831; see, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (reasoning that
the Executive Branch can have no judicial power); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962) (noting that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (proclaiming "[ilt is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Nor did Justice Kennedy
believe it proper to accord the Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act any deference. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491.
179. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. Justice Kennedy noted that if the Act were inter-
preted to compel race-based districting, it would likely be unconstitutional and jeopar-
dize the statute as a whole. Id. at 2492.
180. Id. at 2491, 2492-93 (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366, 1380
(S.D. Ga 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)). The district court noted that it had
"been placed in the unenviable position of depriving black citizens of a privilege the
Justice Department never had the right to grant: maximization of the black vote,
whatever the cost." Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1369 (S.D. Ga 1994), affd,
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)).
181. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141
(1976)). During the 1982 congressional debate on amending the Voting Rights Act, the
proponents of section 5 assured Congress that the Act would not be used to require
proportional representation for minorities. Katherine I. Butier, Affirmative Racial
Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of
Group Rights?, 26 RUrGERS .J. 595, 604 (1995). The Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights in the Carter Administration stated: "[A]ssume . .. that no fairly-drawn
redistricting plan will result in minority control of [one] district, because of dispersed
minority residential patterns, for example. The Department's response is not to de-
mand that the jurisdiction adopt a ... gerrymandered districting plan to ensure . . .
proportional minority representation." Id. at 604 n.20 (citing 1 Voting Rights Act:
Hearings on S.52, S.1761, S.1975, S.1992, and H.R. 3112, Before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
1380, 1388 (1982) (statement of former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
Drew S. Days, 11)).
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tion than before redistricting, the plan is valid.82 As a result, Georgia's
original plan, which created an additional majority-minority district, was
valid under the Act."sM
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence to stress that the
Court's decision should not throw into doubt a large number of congres-
sional districts."M She noted that most states have drawn boundaries in
accordance with customary districting principles, even though race may
have been considered."M Instead, she characterized the majority opinion
as setting the standard for subjecting "extreme instances of gerrymander-
ing" to judicial scrutiny."s
C. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' views on the case substantially mirrored those of Jus-
tice Ginsburg.'87 He viewed Shaw as improperly decided for two rea-
sons. First, it held that a majority's efforts to disenfranchise a minority
for its own gain and a majority's effort to suffer a burden to enfranchise
182. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492, 2493.
183. Id. at 2492.
184. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Despite Justice O'Connor's words, civil
rights groups argue that the decision has created a presumption that all majority-mi-
nority districts are unlawful. Richard Willing, High Court Rejects Race-Based Dis-
tricts; Decision Could Reverse Trend of More Blacks Elected to the U.S. House, DE-
TROrr NEWS, June 30, 1995, at A6.
185. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted: "To invoke strict scru-
tiny, a plaintiff must show that the state relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional practices." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Some scholars
have interpreted Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which supplied the essential fifth
vote, as a significant retreat from Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY LJ. 869, 876 n.36 (1995) (rea-
soning that O'Connor's concurrence makes the state of the law "unclear" insofar as
she would require a "substantial disregard of customary and traditional practices").
Another commentator noted: "Both Adarand and Miller present the crux at which
constitutional and practical judgment have arrived with respect to reverse dis-
crimination, and Justice O'Connor quite evidently is right at that crux." Fried, supra
note 144, at 67. Yet this same commentator also noted: "If Justice O'Connor has
seemed to some to be skittish about this, it is only in the application .... [Slhe
has been fervent in her embrace of the universalistic principle." Id. at 68.
187. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 198-220
(discussing Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion).
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a minority were moral equivalents." Second, the Court failed to identi-
fy which class of voters would have standing to sue and never "coherent-
ly articulated what injury this cause of action is designed to redress."'"
Justice Stevens promoted his own standard for determining when a
districting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause. Under his standard,
a violation would exist when a districting plan serves "'no purpose other
than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic,
or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point
188. Id. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). In his dissent in
Adarand, Justice Stevens wrote: "There is no moral or constitutional equivalence be-
tween a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to
eradicate racial subordination." 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' argument is at complete odds with the views of Justice Thomas, who
wrote in his Adarand concurrence:
I believe that there is a 'moral and constitutional equivalence' between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis
of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. Government can-
not make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal
before the law.
Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
189. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Yet, in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, the Court articulated that "standing may be based on
an interest created by the Constitution." 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951). In a similar vein,
the Court in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP) wrote:
Nor ... could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be suffi-
cient reason to disqualify from seeking review ... any person who had in
fact suffered injury .... To deny standing to persons who are in fact in-
jured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the
most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by
nobody.
412 U.S. 669, 686, 688 (1973).
Furthermore, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court answered similar criti-
cisms with the question: "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?
We believe that it does." 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court deemed segregation in-
herently unequal, reasoning that it is the racial classification itself that causes the inju-
ry. Id. at 494-95; see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. One scholar has
noted that the legal theory represented by Justice Stevens' dissent "would return us to
the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled
by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)." Butler, supra note 181, at 600.
Butler noted that "[bjy logical extension of the ...reasoning that injury depends on
deprivation of representation, a state could hold separate elections for blacks and
whites so long as the seats to be elected by blacks did not exceed their percentage of
the electorate." Id.
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in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the communi-
ty.'"" By his analysis, a redistricting plan that benefits a political mi-
nority does not violate the Equal Protection Clause... because the Con-
stitution does not bar a state from promoting the "fair representation of
different groups."'"
In regard to the injury recognized by Shaw, Justice Stevens queried: "If
the... injury does not flow from an increased probability that white
candidates will lose, then how can the increased probability that black
candidates will win cause white voters, such as respondents, cognizable
harm?"93 Yet, even given Shaw's authority, Justice Stevens saw no in-
jury to the plaintiffs in this case."9 He characterized the majority opin-
ion as allowing relief under the theory of "representational harms."'95
By his understanding of the Shaw representational harms argument,
190. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenling) (quoting Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
191. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens seemingly contradicted his own
dissent in Fulilove v. Klutznick where he stated: "Racial classifications are simply
too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification." 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also
noted in the earlier case that "any official action that treats a person differently on
account of race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect." Id. at 523 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
192. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Stevens, J;, dissenting) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)). The Court in Gaffney v. Cummings wrote:
[N]either we nor the district courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate
a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it under-
takes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or par-
ty, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of pro-
portional representation in the legislative halls of the State.
412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
In response to the Goffney argument, the Court in Shaw explained: "[T]he very
reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifica-
tions is because without it, a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimination
truly is benign." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830 (1993).
193. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White unsuccessfully
argued the same position in Shaw. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dis-
senting).
194. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct.
2431, 2436 (1995)). The Shaw Court declared that representational harms occur when,
in a district drawn to "effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group," elected representatives believe that their duty of representation is owed not
to their constituency as a whole, but only to the minority group that makes up the
majority of their district. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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Justice Stevens argued that a member of a district does not have stand-
ing unless most or all of the prevalent minority group vote for the same
candidate and the winning candidate ignores his white constituents."
Believing that the plaintiffs in Miller failed that test, Justice Stevens
would have dismissed the action.'97
D. Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg felt the Court should hesitate to become involved in
state reapportionment matters and instead should leave them mainly to
the state legislatures.' 8 At the same time, she recognized the necessity
of judicial involvement to secure the voting rights of racial minorities.'"
Justice Ginsburg noted that the tenets of the Constitution were not al-
ways followed and that racial discrimination in voting was rampant fol-
lowing passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.' Joined in her dissent by
Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter, Justice Ginsburg argued against the
majority's inclusion of whites as co-equals in Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence.2"' She maintained that a distinction between majority
and minority interests must be made to protect minority voters. 2 Jus-
tice Ginsburg noted not only America's long history of denying voting
rights to blacks, but also what she believed was an ongoing struggle by
blacks to gain fair representation.2"3 She argued that a majority, by con-
trast, is free from such obstacles, and as a result, can exert its influence
upon state legislators.20 '
196. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a case decided the same
day as Miller, however, the Court noted in dicta that "[w]here a plaintiff resides in a
racially gerrymandered district, ... the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment
because of the legislature's reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to
challenge the legislature's action." United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1995).
197. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra note 164.
199. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Fifteenth Amendment
requires as much, declaring that one's right to vote "shall not be denied . . . by any
state on account of race." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
200. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Eventually the Court inter-
vened and forced jurisdictions to abide by these constitutional requirements. See, e.g.,
Schell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam) (prohibiting the discriminatory appli-
cation of voting tests); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating white
primaries); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (invalidating procedural barriers to
voting); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (prohibiting grandfather clauses).
201. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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In Justice Ginsburg's view, the Court's opinion expanded the scope of
judicial intervention in redistricting cases.2"5 Under her interpretation of
Shaw, judicial intervention in a state's redistricting plan on the basis of
an Equal Protection Clause violation is limited to cases where a district's
shape is "extremely irregular." 2" She viewed the Court's decision as a
move away from the Court's self-imposed limitation to intervene only
where traditional districting practices are completely "set aside."2 °7 She
refused to link the use of race-based decisions with a strict scrutiny
analysis, noting that in United Jewish Organizations of Wiliamsburgh,
Inc. v. Carey,s where "the state 'deliberately used race in a purposeful
manner' to create majority-minority districts,... seven of eight Justices
participating voted to uphold the State's plan without subjecting it to
strict scrutiny."2"
Even under the Court's predominance analysis, Justice Ginsburg ar-
gued that race "did not crowd out all other factors" in the delineation of
205. Id. at 2499-2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2499 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,
2824 (1993)). Justice Ginsburg's contention seems to run afoul from the spirit of
Shaw. While the Court in Shaw pointed to the bizarre shape of the district in sup-
port of its holding, it also observed that laws which "explicitly distinguish between
individuals on racial grounds" are not in line with the "central purpose" of the Equal
Protection Clause. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993). The Court noted that
"[nlo inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when a racial classification appears
on the face of the statute." Id. In the absence of a facial classification, the Court has
required a plaintiff to show the existence of intentional discrimination to trigger strict
scrutiny. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). The Shaw Court used the bi-
zarre shape of the district as evidence of the intentional use of race and thus de-
manded strict scrutiny. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
207. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
208. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
209. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2505 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United Jewish
Org., 430 U.S. at 165). Justice Ginsburg's reasoning may be contrary to Gomiltion v.
Lightfoot, where boundary lines were redrawn to remove black voters from a city.
364 U.S. 339, 345-345 (1960). While blacks were deprived of a right to vote, this was
also true of everyone living outside the city boundaries. Id. at 341. Thus, the claim
was not based on a right of blacks to vote in city elections, but instead on the con-
stitutional protection against inclusion and exclusion from a municipality on the basis
of a racial classification. Id. at 346. As a result of the apparent inconsistency be-
tween the two cases, the majority in Miller held that "(tlo the extent any of the
opinions in [United Jewish Organizations] can be interpreted as suggesting that a
state's assignment of voters on the basis of race would be subject to anything but
our strictest scrutiny, those views ought not to be deemed controlling." Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2487-88.
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the Georgia district.2" She pointed to the redistricting drafters' accom-
modation of a particular state senator by placing his son in the district
and of a state representative by keeping his black neighborhood intact
outside of the Eleventh District.2 1' She found the boundaries of the dis-
trict distinguishable from the configuration at issue in Shaw, where the
lines used to define the extremely irregular shape of the North Carolina
district"2 were drawn with race alone in mind.213 In her view, the
Georgia district reflected the use of traditional districting principles with
respect to size, shape, and political subdivisions.2 1' Justice Ginsburg
noted that Georgia's Eleventh District was absent from a "statistically
calculated list of the twenty-eight most bizarre districts in the United
States."" 5 She also noted that the district's land area was about aver-
age, not out of proportion with other districts in the state,2"6 and was
generally respectful of political boundaries, ranking about average among
Georgia's districts in divided counties.2"7
Justice Ginsburg alternatively argued that race alone is enough to cre-
ate a community of interests by which districting should be proper.2"8
She noted that legislators have districted according to "ethnicity" for a
long time.2"' She reasoned that denying blacks their own districts, while
210. Mi/er, 115 S. Ct. at 2502 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2503-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2502 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993)). Justice
Ginsburg noted that the district at issue in Shaw spanned 160 miles and was, "'for
much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor.'" Id. at 2502 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21). One of the district's legislators said,
"'[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the
people in the district'" Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at
2820-21) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at
A4).
213. Id. at 2502-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Yet, as noted earlier, Justice Kennedy
viewed such a distinction as less important in Mi//er because irrespective of the
shape of Georgia's Eleventh District, there was direct evidence that racial consider-
ations predominated. Id. at 2489; see also Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372,
1378 (S.D. Ga 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
214. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2502-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Pildes & Niemi, supra note 110, at
565.
216. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1396 n.4
(Edmondson, J., dissenting)).
217. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Yet, as noted earlier, Justice Kennedy judged the
district not just according to its geometric shape, but as a whole, together with its
racial and population densities. Id. at 2489.
218. Id. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BE-
YOND THE MELTING POT 19-20 (1963) ("[Mlany elements-history, family and feeling,
interest, formal organizational life-operate to keep much of New York life channeled
within the bounds of [an] ethnic group."); E. LIr, BEYOND PLURALISM: ETHNIC POLrCs
1346
[Vol. 23: 1317, 1996] Miller v. Johnson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
allowing gerrymandered districts for other ethnic groups, "would shut
out 'the very minority group whose history in the United States gave
birth to the Equal Protection Clause.'"22 '
V. IMPACT
A. Judicial Impact
Together with Adarand and Shaw, Miller v. Johnson crystallizes the
Courts' developing Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. The current
Supreme Court seems determined to remove many of the vestiges of
racial classifications from government decision making.' Some observ-
ers feel that the end result may be the total prohibition on the use of
racial classifications by the government.2
Justice Ginsburg warned in her dissent that Millers legacy will be
increased litigation."n By her analysis, determining when districting
plans are predominantly motivated by race, and therefore impermissible,
IN AMERICA 2 (1970) ("[E]thnic forces play a surprisingly persistent role in our poli-
tics"); H. Bailey & E. Katz, Preface to ETHNIC GROUP POLITICS at ix (H. Bailey & E.
Katz eds., 1969) ("[E]thnic identifications do exist and ... one cannot really under-
stand the American political process without giving special attention to racial, reli-
gious and national minorities.")). Further, Justice Ginsburg argued that America has a
long history of drawing district lines in accordance with ethnic groupings. Mi//er, 115
S. Ct. at 2505 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing STEVEN P. ERIE, RAINBOW'S END: IRISH-
AMERICANS AND THE DILEMMAS OF URBAN MACHINE POLITICS, 1840-1985 91 (1988) (not-
ing that Jersey City's "Horseshoe district" lumped "most of the city's Irish together")
and Coveted Landmarks Add a Twist to Redistricting Task, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1991, at Al, A24 (noting how one Irish Catholic state assemblyman "wanted his dis-
trict drawn following [Catholic] parish lines so all the parishes where he went to
baptisms, weddings and funerals would be in his district.")). On the other hand, op-
ponents of race-based districting argue that these examples are by no means as ex-
treme as Georgia's gathering of blacks from distant areas to create the Eleventh Dis-
trict. Fried, supra note 144, at 65. Further, their "commonality" encompassed more
than simply their ethnicity. Id. at 65 n.350.
220. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816, 2845 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
221. Coyle, supra note 152, at Al.
222. In her article, Coyle noted that "[t]he Court has moved substantially toward
adoption of a color-blind Constitution under which the government can never have a
Icompelling interest' justifying race-based classifications." Id. This conclusion is proba-
bly unwarranted because the Court has continuously stressed that race-conscious
state decision making is not completely barred. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,
2824, 2826 (1993); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488; id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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will not be easy. 24 She noted that "[glenuine attention to traditional
districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations seemed,
under Shaw, to provide a safe harbor."225 After Miller, Justice Ginsburg
suggested that states will know if their race-based districts are safe only
through litigation.226 She characterized the majority's new standard as
an "invitation to litigat[ion]" anytime that plaintiffs "plausibly allege that
other factors carried less weight than race."227 This may create a "catch-
22" for drafters of legislative districts, for "[i]f the state draws a majority-
black district, it can get sued by whites under uncertain standards, and if
it doesn't draw them, it can be sued by minorities for failing to comply
with the Voting Rights Act." 8 In the end, Justice Ginsburg predicted
that a large number of federal judges will find themselves "drawn into
the fray."2
29
224. Id. at 2506-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg is not alone in her
opinion. It has been noted that while the Court in Miller freed lower courts from in-
terpreting Shaw's vague bizarreness standard, "Miller established a standard that is at
least as difficult to comprehend." Leading Cases, supra note 153, at 165. Further, the
new standard may become difficult to prove as legislators begin to realize how to
make the predominance of race in their districting process seem like something
else-perhaps "geographic vicinity" or "party affiliation." Id.
225. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor gave the
perception of a "safe harbor" when she wrote in Shaw that "traditional districting
principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions . . .
-are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been ger-
lyrvMndered on racial lines." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
226. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
227.; Id. at 2505 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Some fear that this new litigation will be
"skewed" by legislators whose primary allegiance is to their party. Leading Cases,
supra note 153, at 165.
228. Richard C. Reuben, A 'Simple Command' Creates Confusion: Validity of Thou-
sands of Redistricting Plans in Doubt After High Court Ruling, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995,
at 19.
229. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Reuben, supra
note 228, at 18 (arguing that we will see "a new era of trench litigation and debate
not seen in at least a generation"). Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Miller,
argued the contrary, noting that the decision "does not throw into doubt the vast
majority of the nation's 435 congressional districts," presuming that in the majority of
cases, the states have used "customary districting principles." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Dillard v. City of Greensboro, the first redistrict-
ing case after Miller to make its way to the Federal Court of Appeals, black plain-
tiffs challenged the multimember districting scheme used in Alabama to elect its
county commissioners and city councils, alleging that it violated section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. 74 F.2d 230, 231 (lth Cir. 1996). The City of Greensboro conced-
ed that their districting violated the Voting Rights Act, and submitted a new plan to
the Justice Department. Id. The Attorney General denied preclearance under section
5, however, arguing that not enough majority-minority districts were created. Id. at
232. A magistrate judge, appointed by the district court, approved a plan submitted
by the black plaintiffs that created three majority-minority districts. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit held that Miller was controlling and remanded the case for a determination of
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Civil rights groups, politicians, and others looked to Miller for the
answers left unresolved after Sha--primarily, the kind of role race can
play in the redistricting processY° The Court's answer in Miller was
not particularly clear."' In determining the role that race will play in
drafting future districts, two issues must be addressed. First, the Court
gave little guidance to lower courts on how to determine whether race
was an impermissible predominant consideration in designing a district.
Miller tells us that race is a predominant consideration when traditional
districting principles are forsaken,' but the Court provides little help
in determining at what point these principles become forsaken. Second,
the Court did not address whether race-based districting can be a reme-
dy for past discrimination. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act gives the
Justice Department the authority to deny the preclearance of any retro-
gressive voting procedure." In Shaw, the Court wrote that "[a] reap-
portionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding
retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to
avoid retrogression."' Nevertheless, the Shaw Court also noted that
there is "a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past ra-
cial discrimination."' The Miller Court reiterated that statement, but
stated that because the State failed to argue that the district was created
to remedy past discrimination, it was not an issue." In City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 7 the Court noted that an affirmative action
plan would fulfill a compelling state interest where there was a "'strong
basis in evidence for [the] conclusion that remedial action was neces-
sary.'"' In Miller, the Court used the same standard in analyzing race-
based districting claims, noting its insistence on "a strong basis in evi-
dence of the harm being remedied."' Yet, the Court did not elaborate
whether race was the predominant consideration in drawing the district. Id. at 231-33.
230. See Coyle, supra note 152, at Al.
231. One scholar noted: "[Tihe Court's attempted bright-line ruling is clear as mud."
Richard C. Reuben, Heading Back to the Thicket: Voting District Cases Pose Politi-
caUy and Racially Charged Questions, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 40.
232. Mitter, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
233. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976).
234. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993).
235. Id.
236. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
237. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
239. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. The Court's insinuation that remedial race-based
districting may be constitutional seems to be self-contradictory. If classifications based
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on the application of such a standard. Further, the scope of the decision
is not clear. According to the director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Voting Rights Project, "[tihe [Miller] opinion affects everything
from congressional to school board and water districts."24 ° As a result
of the decision, Georgia is not only dealing with its stricken congressio-
nal district, but is also looking into correcting its state legislative dis-
tricts.
24 1
Even when it is established that race was a predominant consideration
in drafting a district and strict scrutiny is deemed applicable, it is uncer-
tain how the Court will apply the standard. Prior to Adarand and Miller,
strict scrutiny was viewed as "strict in theory, fatal in fact."2 42 Yet, the
current Court has signaled that strict scrutiny may not be as harsh as in
the past.2" An often repeated idea that permeates Croson, Adarand,
Shaw, and Miller is that strict scrutiny will be used only to determine the
"good" from the "bad."2' Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi
argue that the Court's use of a strict scrutiny analysis represents a "legal
middle ground" between complete colorblindness and "the preferential
use of race to enhance the political or economic position of previously
predominantly on race are invidious to our system of government, then both remedial
and nonremedial racial classifications would be unconstitutional. See Miiler, 115 S. Ct.
at 2482.
240. Reuben, supra note 228, at 18.
241. Id.
242. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). In his
Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens noted that strict scrutiny "has usually been under-
stood to spell the death of any governmental action to which a court may apply it"
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2121 n.1 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
243. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117. In Adarand, the Court wrote that it "wish[ed] to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'" Id. (quot-
ing Fulilove, 448 U.S. at 519). The Court noted United States v. Paradise where it
found that a state's action constituted "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discrimina-
tory conduct" and endorsed a race-based remedy accordingly. Id. at 2118 (citing Unit-
ed States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
244. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (noting that "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses
of race by insuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool."); Adarand, 115 S. Ct at 2113 (noting that
"[tihe point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the government in support
of a racial classification, and the evidence offered to show that the classification is
needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in govern-
mental decisionmaking."). Yet, states may find it almost impossible to satisfy the
narrowly tailored prong because a court will almost always be able to come up with
an alternative purpose that applies more traditional districting principles. Tricia A.
Martinez, When Appearance Matters: Reapportionment Under the Voting Rights Act
and Shaw v. Reno, 54 LU L REV. 1335, 1364 (1994).
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disadvantaged minorities."245 Yet, even the conservative members of the
Court are not in complete agreement on what strict scrutiny means. Jus-
tice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in Adarand that "government
can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of
race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction."'
B. Societal Impact
The perceived impact of Miller depends on what side of the raced-
based districting argument the observer falls. Proponents of race-based
districting argue quite strongly that the Court's actions will hinder further
achievement and success in the black community.247 They view the
Court's actions as "declaring the nation 'colorblind' regardless of the
reality."2" Their reality is a racially polarized electorate where whites
vote only for whites, and blacks only for blacks.24 One study on racial
245. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 110, at 504.
246. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
247. Coyle, supra note 152, at Al.
248. Id. Harvard Professor Morton Horwitz noted that the Court's demand for a
color-blind Constitution "wishe[s] away existing racial realities with the same cruel
formalism that was characteristic of the Court's post-Civil War decisions." Morton J.
Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Pt1ndamentality Without _undamentalism, 107 HARv. L REV. 30, 106 (1993).
Other proponents of race-based districting argue that "[tihe Voting Rights Act
implicitly acknowledges that... race-consciousness exists in practice and that it
should be harnessed in a progressive, or at least non-retrogressive, manner." Leading
Cases, supra note 153, at 166-67. Those that favor a color-blind Constitution respond
that "the system is truly purged of racial bias only when the law treats all groups,
including whites, without distinction." Alexandra Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal
Protection and the Dilemma of Interminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L REV. 1059,
1062 n.18 (1995) (citing Richard A. Epstein, Tuskegee Modern, or Group Rights Under
the Constitution, 80 Ky. L REV. 869, 881-85 (1992)).
249. Dayna Cunningham, Insuring Access: Redistricting and Representation, NAT'L
B. A. MAG., Dec. 8, 1994, at 13. Cunningham noted that "race continues to be the
single most decisive determinant of political behavior in American life." Id. One
scholar noted:
What the Supreme Court is reluctant to acknowledge is that the Voting
Rights Act is still needed. There are still attempts to disenfranchise and di-
lute the minority vote. Racially polarized voting is a reality. Black candidates,
as a rule, are still unable to be elected in majority white districts. The judi-
cial and political discourse is ignoring that reality.
Nancy K Barton, The Voting Rights Act: Over the Hill at Age 30?, 22-FALL HUM. RTs.
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voting patterns in the South concluded that "a jurisdiction nearly always
must have more than a [fifty percent] black population for black candi-
dates to be elected. " " Twenty-five years ago, one percent of districts
where whites held a majority elected a black representative.25" ' Even to-
day, in districts where the black population hovers around twenty-five
percent, it is estimated that only around one percent of elected positions
would be filled by blacks were majority-minority districts eliminated.252
In a study of South Carolina election races where whites and blacks ran
against each other, whites voted for other whites ninety percent of the
time, while blacks voted for other blacks eighty-five percent of the
time.2
From the point of view of some individuals, majority-minority districts
have proven extraordinarily successful in neutralizing the minorities'
natural disadvantage in the voting process." Certainly a dramatic surge
in black office holding has taken place over the past thirty years, from
two black officeholders in 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was passed,
to 160 black officeholders in 1990.255 It was during this time span that
majority-minority districts proliferated.2' After the 1990 Census, which
10, 30 (1995).
250. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L REV 1359, 1368 (1995)
(reviewing THE POLmCS OF RACE QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson
& Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1373. In the wake of Miller, civil rights activists argue that the decision
"could reduce the 38 [sic] congressional seats now held by African-Americans to
merely a handful." Jan Crawford Greenburg, Race-Based Districts Banned: Vote Power
of Blacks Jeopardized, CI. TRIB., June 30, 1995, at 1. Such projections may be some-
what dubious. First, those projections are based on past voting habits and do not
take into account that racial attitudes are rapidly changing. Thernstrom, supra note
93, at 933. Thernstrom has noted that the record of black electoral success decades
ago "tells us little about the prospects for such success today." Id. Second, those
projections do not take into account that unfortunately blacks do not enter electoral
races in the same numbers as whites do. Id. at 933. Simply stated, "black candidates
cannot win races they do not enter." Id. Third, no candidate of any race can win an
election if their political views are contrary to those of a majority of their electorate.
Id. at 934. California Congressman Ronald V. Dellums has been repeatedly reelected
as a black in a majority-white district because his left-leaning views are in-synch with
his Berkeley electorate. Id. On the other end of the spectrum, Oklahoma Congress-
man J.C. Watts won his election as a black in a majority-white district because his
conservative views matched those of Oklahoma voters. Id. Congressman Watts' elec-
tion symbolizes the fact that conservative candidates in the South, whether black or
white, do better than those who are "militantly liberal." Id.
253. James W. Loewen, Racial Bloc Voting and Political Mobilization in South
Carolina, 19 REV. BLACK POL ECON. 23, 24 (1990).
254. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1370.
255. Id. at 1367.
256. Id. at 1370.
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caused state legislatures to adopt new districting schemes, this country
saw "the largest increases in minority representation since the Voting
Rights Act was passed."25 7 The number of majority-minority districts
doubled, going from twenty-six to fifty-two.2" Further, there was a
twenty-three percent increase in the number of majority-black state legis-
lative districts.259 Today, blacks sit on city councils in numbers roughly
proportional to their population." It can be argued that the increase. in
black representation in Congress has resulted in a greater say in issues
of particular interest to the black community.26'
Members of the black community have criticized the Court for at-
tempting to eliminate racial preferences, arguing its true effect is to elim-
inate preferences for blacks, leaving the "natural" preferences for whites
in our society intact.262 Twenty years ago, four justices of the Supreme
257. Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of
Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L REV. 1, 2 (1995).
258. Id. at 59 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Number of Congressional Dis-
tricts with Black or Hispanic Majorities Double, Census Bureau Says, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE NEWS, Mar. 24, 1993).
259. Id.
260. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1367.
261. For example, in the first half of the Clinton Administration, the Congressional
Black Caucus achieved major concessions in President Clinton's budget and those
conservative and moderate Democrats that sought to cap entitlements were partly
defeated by caucus opposition. Kenneth J. Cooper, For Enlarged Congressional Black
Caucus, a New Kind of Impact, WASH. POST, Sept; 19, 1993, at A4. Further, the Cau-
cus successfully defeated the Clinton Administration's nominee for Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights because of his lukewarm support for majority-minority dis-
tricts. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton's Choice For Rights Chief Is Withdrawing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1993, at Al. On the other hand, it is also argued that these districts
"marginalize the black elected officials upon whom the voters count to represent
their interests effectively." Thernstrom, supra note 93, at 935. Lani Guinier, a former
United States Attorney General nominee noted: "[Bilacks elected from single-member
districts have little control over policy choices made by their white counterparts.
Thus, although it ensures more representatives, district-based black electoral success
may not necessarily result in more responsive government." Lani Guinier, The Tri-
umph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success,
89 MICH. L REV. 1077, 1080 (1991). Minorities may find their interests better repre-
sented by dispersing their votes over more "influence districts" because more elected
officials would then owe their success to minority votes. Thernstrom, supra note 93,
at 935. One conmnentator remarked: "In a representative democracy, the power of an
interest group lies not in how many of its number are elected to office, but in how
many elected officials it has the power to influence." Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper
into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme
Court, 43 EMORY LJ. 1519, 1550 (1994).
262. Leading Cases, supra note 153, at 168. Proponents of race-based districting
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Court wrote that "we cannot... let color blindness become myopia
which masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated with-
in our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citi-
zens."2" From that point of view, the Miller case has a huge impact be-
cause it symbolizes for many that the Court is no longer responsive to
the needs of minorities." 4 Further, it may mean that there will be fewer
blacks in Congress because the favorable district boundaries that place
them in office could be changed.2" Consequently, Congress will be less
representative of black interests as a whole. Aforementioned University
of Michigan Law Professor Richard Pildes supports this theory." He
concludes that a strong link exists between the race of the representative
and the benefits provided to minorities.267 Among these benefits, Pro-
fessor Pildes includes "improvements in municipal services in minority
communities, increased use of minority contractors, more appointments
of minorities to commissions and boards, the creation of police review
boards, and general shifts in program priorities.""
.For others, the impact of Miller is very different. In Shaw v. Reno,"
the Court vocalized the problems inherent in race-based districting. Jus-
tice O'Connor associated "apartheid" with the "perception [behind race-
based districting] that members of the same racial group-regardless of
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls."270 Additionally, Justice O'Connor viewed
interpret the Court's decision in Miller to mean "that districts that are 'set aside' for
black representatives are unconstitutionally segregated by race, while districts that are
drawn to protect white incumbents are simply following traditional districting princi-
ples." Id.
263. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Coyle, supra note 152, at Al.
265. Id.
266. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1377.
267. Id.
268. Id; see also RUFUS P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE
OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 141, 168 (1984) (noting
that "minority council members were important in linking minorities to city hall, in
providing role models, and in sensitizing white colleagues to minority concerns.");
JAMES W. BUTrrON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: IMPACT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES 226, 227 (1989) (explaining that "black representation on
the inside . . . gave [black citizens] easy, constant, and relatively quick access to the
decision making arena and to white leaders, both public and private.").
269. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
270. Id. at 2816. On the other hand, many proponents of race-based districting
maintain that blacks are, for the most part, a unified people. J. Morgan Kousser,
Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and Representation, 47 RUTGERS
L J. 625, 648 (1995). They note that "[the vast majority of African-Americans are
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such race-based standards as dangerous to our system of govern-
ment.27' She cited cases noting that "'[ilf our society is to continue to
progress... it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race
stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and inju-
ry.'"272 Justice O'Connor believed that this injury continues because
race-based districting "reinforce[s] the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of
their skin." 273 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor wrote that such policies
"threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a
racial group and to incite racial hostility."274 She stated that "'[wihen ra-
cial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial,
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together
as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion
rather than to political issues are generated .... , She also noted
that "[r]acial gerrymandering... may balkanize us into competing racial
factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political sys-
tem in which race no longer matters."276 The majority in Shaw believed
that race-based districts reinforce "racial stereotypes and threaten[] to
undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elect-
ed officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
constituency as a whole."
277
driven toward unity because they are still discriminated against, and racial bloc vot-
ing is already a stark reality." Id.
271. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
272. Id. at 2827 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31
(1991)).
273. Id. at 2832.
274. Id. at 2824 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
275. Id. at 2827 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)). One commentator noted: "'Fostering election of officials who need not
appeal to members of other races seems an odd way to pursue Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s dream of a land where his children will not be judged by the color of their
skin, but by the content of their character.'" Hamilton, supra note 261, at 1552 (quot-
ing Stuart Taylor, Electing by Race, Am. LAW., June 1991, at 54).
276. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. Justice O'Connor previously noted in Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC that race-based assignments "embody stereotypes that treat indi-
viduals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts--their very
worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and
the Constitution." 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). To those on the other
side however, race does matter. Kousser, supra note 270, at 662-65. They argue that
black voters, especially in the South, are consistently more liberal than whites. Id.
277. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828. Conversely, promoters of majority-minority districts
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Conservatives have long argued that discrimination breeds discrimina-
tion."78 In Holder v. Hall," Justice Thomas argued that race-based
districts portend "disastrous implications," creating "political homelands"
that will inevitably "deepen racial divisions" because they are based on
the assumption that blacks "all think alike on important matters of public
policy." '8 It is true that a growing number of black officials appeal to
voters across racial lines."l For instance, in the 1994 Congress, eleven
members of the Congressional Black Caucus represented districts where
black voters were a minority.'
Voting rights scholar Abigail Thernstrom examined mayoral races
across the country and noted that in cities where the population exceed-
argue that elected officials will truly "pay special attention" to those who they feel
got them into office. Kousser, supra note 270, at 649. They note that white congress-
men are just as susceptible as black congressmen to favoring one side. Id.
278. See Natapoff, supra note 248, at 1062 n.18. Even nonconservatives realize a
problem. Lani Guinier has argued that majority-minority districts contribute to the
isolation of minorities and those they elect, and may even contribute to their political
margnalization. Guinier, supra note 261, at 1079-80, 1101-34; see also Lani Guinier,
Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go From Here, in CONTROvER-
SIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT IN PERSPECTIVE 283, 286-287 (Ber-
nard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). Journalist and commentator Juan
Williams has expressed similar views, suggesting that the demands of black legislators
for more seats in Congress has itself caused a backlash against liberalism and
"pushed black America out of the mainstream of the national political dialogue." Juan
Williams, Blacked Out in the Newt Congress: The Black Caucus Regroups as Jesse
Mulls a Third Party Bid, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at Cl.
279. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
280. Id. at 2597-99, 2618 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy argued in his Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC dissent that the idea that
individuals who share the same race will also share the same political interests is
"based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to
certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens." Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
281. Thernstrom, supra note 93, at 932. Thernstrom noted: "Whites not only say
they will vote for black candidates; they do so, often casting their ballots for an
African-American nmning against a white opponent." Id.
282. Odious Imprint of Apartheid, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1994, at A12 (editorial).
These figures are seriously contested. University of Michigan Professor Richard Pildes
noted:
Of the thirty-eight black members of the House in the 103rd Congress, only
two were clearly elected from majority-white congressional districts; two
more were elected from districts of complex composition. Of the remaining
thirty-four black congresspersons, thirty represented districts whose total pop-
ulation was majority-black and whose voting age population was either major-
ity-black or majority-minority (black plus hispanic). The four remaining dis-
tricts electing blacks to the 103rd Congress were similarly ones in which
black and hispanic minority voters together constituted a substantial majority.
Pildes, supra note 250, at 1374-75.
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ed 50,000 people, "[slixty-seven percent of the black mayors elected...
over the last thirty years have not had the benefit of a majority-black
constituency."m Blacks have also won gubernatorial' 4 and senatori-
al285 races where the vast majority of the voting population was
white.
2W
Dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 7 Justice Harlan argued that "[tihe
destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked togeth-
er, and the interests of both require that the common government of all
shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction
of law."as For those who share those ideals, this decision implies that
state-sponsored discrimination is on its last leg. Once gone, private dis-
crimination will have no model in the form of a state equivalent, and
thus will slowly perish. The Miller Court heavily criticized the Justice
Department for its execution of the Voting Rights Act.' For those criti-
cal of the Justice Department's policies in this regard, Miller is a major
"'wake-up call'" to the Department.' It reaffirms the holding of Beer v.
283. Thernstrom, supra note 93, at 932. In Maine, where the black population totals
less than half of one percent, blacks are mayors of two important cities. Id. at 933.
In New York City, Rudolph Guiliani lost nearly a third of the white vote to his black
opponent in the 1989 mayoral race. Id. Over a third of whites voted for Sharon
Sayles Belton, a black candidate and the subsequent victor in the 1993 Minneapolis
mayoral race. Id. In the same election cycle, nearly a third of whites voted for black
candidate Freeman Bosely, Jr., in the St. Louis mayoral race, even though three
whites ran against him. Id.
284. L Douglas Wilder, elected governor of Virginia -in 1989, received between 40
and 4396 of the white vote, only two to five percentage points less than his white
predecessor. Id.
285. Carol Mosley-Braun was elected to the United States Senate from Illinois in
1992, despite the fact that Illinois has a black population of less than 1296. Id.
286. Id. On the other hand, Lani Guinier has argued that conservative blacks who
appeal to a majority-white electorate are not "authentically" black. LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 55-58 (1994). In her view, representation by conservative
blacks is no representation at all. Id. Guinier's basic premise is that black officehold-
ers who are not "community-based," "culturally-rooted," and "politically, psychological-
ly, and culturally black" are meaningless tokens. Guinier, supra note 261, at 1103.
287. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
288. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
289. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491 (1995). The district court also criti-
cized the Justice Department, and accused the Justice Department of deploying infor-
mants. Miller v. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995). It further called "the considerable influence of ACLU advocacy on the
voting rights decisions of the United States Attorney General .. . an embarrassment."
Id. at 1368.
290. Reuben, supra note 228, at 19 (quoting Professor James Blumstein, Vanderbilt
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United States that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act simply requires
states to prevent minority voting rights from getting any worse.29" '
In either case, Miller will have an impact on the two-party system. The
Republican Party has been maling serious gains in the South in recent
years.' Many white Democrats and liberal scholars blame this erosion,
at least in part, on the policy of race-based districting.293 One commen-
tator noted:
[R]eapportionment not only siphoned solid Democratic votes from white districts,
but also helped Republicans attract higher-caliber candidates and raise more mon-
ey by giving them a better shot at winning those districts. In addition, when black
voters were removed from marginally Republican districts, the Democrat's chanc-
es of winning such seats became that much slimmer.'
While it is true that race-based districts virtually assure that the repre-
sentative from that district will be a Democrat (because minorities vote
overwhelmingly Democratic), it may have the inevitable counter-effect of
removing vital Democratic votes from neighboring districts, making them
more Republican."' It is no accident that a Republican President ap-
pointed the Attorney General who denied Georgia's redistricting plan and
required that a third majority-minority district be created in Georgia.'
The Bush Administration's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
University School of Law). The Court's decision in Miller may have "loosened the
reins with which the Justice Department has held state legislatures." Leading Cases,
supra note 153, at 166. As a result, "state legislatures will find it easier to draw dis-
tricts that are more to their liking." Id. Proponents of a strong Justice Department
role in redistricting argue that "state legislatures left to their own devices will gener-
ally protect incumbents, who are, by and large, white." Id.
291. Reuben, supra note 228, at 19 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976)). The Justice Department's actions in the Georgia case were nothing new.
Thernstrom, supra note 93, at 930. It has been a "freewheeling" policy of the Justice
Department to determine what is "racially fair." Id. A 1981 Justice Department memo-
randum on Alabama's Barbour County council districts noted the ease with which the
Department determined fairness: "Since blacks constitute 40.5 percent of the voting
age population, they would be entitled to 2.8 districts [that is, two viable districts
plus a third influence district]." Id. at 930-31. Vanderbilt University School of Law
Professor James Blumstein noted that "[tlhe Justice Department's position has com-
pletely ignored Beer, and the Court in this case was really saying it meant what it
said back in 1976." Reuben, supra note 228, at 19.
292. Paul West, Southern Democrats Turn into a Vanishing Breed, BALTIMORE SUN,
June 25, 1995, at Al.
293. Selwyn Carter, African-American Voting Rights: An Historical Struggle, 44
EMORY LJ. 859, 859 (1995); Timothy G. 0' Rourk, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of
Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 723, 725-26 (1995).
294. Steven A. Holmes, Did Racial Redistricting Undermine Democrats?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 32.
295. Id.
296. Abigail Thernstrom, Shaw v. Reno: Notes From a Political Thicket, 1994 PUB.
INTEREST L REV. 35, 39 (1994).
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vocally advocated that minorities were entitled to their "fair share of
political power," which he defined as a "proportional number of legisla-
tive seats."1 7 Throughout the 1980s, the Republican Party, and in partic-
ular General Counsel Benjamin Ginsburg, aggressively used the Voting
Rights Act and majority-minority districting to promote partisan
goals." The party has even intervened in districting cases on the side
of minority plaintiffs.299 After the 1994 elections, General Counsel
Ginsburg was quoted as saying: "Look at the results .... We'd be nuts to
want to see these [majority-minority] districts abolished. "3"
Nevertheless, this conventional wisdom, accepted by the Republican
Party and most scholars, has not gone uncontested. Those who argue
that the benefit to conservative representation in Congress is far more
negligible than suggested note that the proliferation of majority-minority
districts after the 1990 census led to the defeat of only a few white Dem-
ocrats in the 1992 election.3"' Some contend that this was due in large
297. Id.
298. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1380 n.89. One observer noted:
An alliance of convenience . . has developed between civil rights law-
yers-who for 25 years have battled with astonishing success for full voting
rights for blacks and other minorities-and Republicans, whose enthusiasm
for minority office-holding surfaced more recently, in tandem with their
awareness of how it can help their side.
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Electing by Race, AM. LAW., June 1991, at 50.
299. For example, in Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991), the Re-
publican Party supported the black plaintiffs who demanded their own majority-minor-
ity district. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1380 n.89. Republicans have also given techni-
cal map-drawing help to black groups seeking the creation of majority-minority dis-
tricts. See Peter Bragdon, Democrats' Ties to Minorities May Be Tested by New
Lines, CONG. Q. WxLY. REP. 1739, 1741 (1990).
300. Holmes, supra note 294, at 32. See generally Kimball Brace et al., Does Redis-
tricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help Republicans?, 49 J. POL 169, 182
n.15 (1987) (detailing alliances between the Republican Party and minority groups in
redistricting fights).
301. Frank Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement in the Bush Administration: The
Four Year Record, in REPORT ON THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES: CIVIL RIGHTS AT A CROSSROADS 118 (Susan M. Liss & William L Taylor
eds., 1992). According to a study by Allan J. Lichtmnan, Professor of History at Amer-
ican University, "'Democrats actually fared a bit better in the nine states with new
black districts [Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Texas
and Virginia] [sic] than in the 41 states with no such districts." Carter, supra note
293, at 862 (quoting Allan J. Lichtman, Redistricting, in Black and White: Quotas
Aren't the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A2). It was also noted that Democrats
had their greatest losses in the senatorial and gubernatorial races, where redistricting
is irrelevant. Id. The Lichtman study suggested that had the Democrats not lost a
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part to the creativity of the legislative drafters who "made a concerted
effort both to create majority-minority districts and to preserve white in-
cumbents (sometimes of both parties) by clever maneuvering of district
lines that retained just enough of the core of the incumbents' political
bases to enable them to get reelected.""2 For instance, almost three
quarters of black voters who were moved into majority-minority districts,
were moved from Republican dominated districts, where the black vote
was not having much of an effect.' In its analysis of the 1994 election
results, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund noted that forty-
seven of the fifty-four seats which the Democrats lost "were either in
states without majority-minority districts, in white districts surrounded
by other white districts, or in districts in which the percentage of minori-
ty voters in post-1990 redistricting either increased or remained con-
stant."3" The NAACP argues that the existence of majority-minority dis-
tricts may have even prevented additional Democratic losses.0 A Dem-
ocratic task force examining the effect of majority-minority districts in
1994 somewhat supported the NAACP position, placing the figure at five
to nine Democrat seats lost due to redistricting." In the end, these
analyses may be somewhat dubious because they examined only the 1994
elections. Professor Pildes noted that "[t]o determine the relative con-
tributions of ideology, race of the candidate, and other factors to voter
preferences, one election cannot be studied in isolation. " "
If one accepts the conventional wisdom that majority-minority districts
help Republicans, then clearly one of the big winners after Miller is the
Democratic Party. If the Democratic Party is truly more sensitive to mi-
nority interests than the Republican Party, the result may be that while
minorities will lose some representation by members of their own race,
single congressional seat in the nine states with new majority-minority districts, "the
Republicans would still have gained control of the House." Id. (citing Lichtman, su-
pra at A2).
302. Parker, supra note 257, at 55.
303. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1385; see also HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G.
NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN PoLrIcs 203 (4th ed. 1994) (noting that most of
the blacks moved from white districts to black districts were taken from Republican
districts).
304. O'Rourk, supra note 293, at 725-26 n.ll (quoting Steven A. Holmes, Civil
Rights Group Disputes Election Analyses on Black Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1994, at Al).
305. Id.
306. Thomas B. Edsall, Racial Redistricting Had Minor Role Nov. 8, Analysts Say,
WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1994, at A4.
307. Pildes, supra note 250, at 1379 n.85. In spite of this Pildes argues that because
black Democrats tend to be more liberal than white Democrats, the practice of race-
based districting may have the effect of increasing the net-liberalism in Congress. Id.
at 1385-87.
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their ideological representation, by those who share their same philoso-
phy, will increase. 5
Further, while the Court has taken a hardline view towards racial ger-
rymandering, it has been very lenient towards political gerrymandering.
Since the Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer," which established
the justiciability of political gerrymandering, no state has lost a case
involving the purposeful drawing of legislative districts for predominantly
political purposes' ° At the same time, the Republican Party has taken
over a majority of state governorships and its share of state legislature
seats is on the upswing."' Because the vast majority of minorities in
this country are Democrats,"2 the political power of minorities may be
hit with a double blow, for their political party may become the subject
of unfavorable partisan gerrymandering, and at the same time they may
lose their racially gerrymandered districts. 3
308. While the number of black representatives remained the same in the wake of
the 1994 elections, their power and influence suffered a dramatic decline. Prior to the
1994 elections, all but one member of the Congressional Black Caucus was a Demo-
crat, and many Caucus members held committee and subcommittee chairmanships.
O'Rourk, supra note 293, at 727-28. After the election, no member of the Black Cau-
cus held a chairmanship. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 278, at C1, C4. Further,
one of the first actions of the 1994 Republican Congress was to cut off federal fund-
ing to the Congressional Black and Hispanic caucuses. Carter, supra note 293, at 859.
309. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
310. Anthony Q. Fletcher, White Lines, Black Districts-Shaw v. Reno and the Di-
lution of the Anti-Dilution Principle, 29 HI-ARv. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 231, 250 (1994); see
also Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989) (upholding a California districting plan de-
signed to maximize Democratic advantage); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(upholding a redistricting plan designed to split the districts evenly among the two
parties).
311. Clinton Pledged to Work With the Republican Leaders of the Next Congress,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at Al.
312. In 1990, 7.5% of registered voters were black, the vast majority of which were
Democrats. Anne Groer, The Politics of Race; In Campaign Parlance, Equality and
Equity Can Become 'Wedge' Issues Used to Divide Voters, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Dec. 8, 1991, at G1. In the presidential elections of 1992, the Democratic ticket re-
ceived 82% of the black vote and 62% of the Hispanic vote. Portrait of the Electorate,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B9.
313. This is a real concern for many minority activists. Their position is simple:
"Unless the Court is prepared to propose an objective formula for apportionment or
otherwise fundamentally alter the electoral system in a manner that addresses the
problems of political gerrymandering, it should not attempt to attack gerrymandering
with sporadic shots at state legislatures in the limited instances in which racial con-
siderations appear to 'predominate.'" Leading Cases, supra note 153, at 170. This has
also been a concern of Justice White. In his dissent in Shaw, he noted that when the
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, it is important to note that the Court in Miller has not said
that racial considerations may not be taken into account.' 4 Justice
Ginsburg noted that "[tlo offend the Equal Protection Clause, all agree,
the legislature had to do more than consider race."" '" The majority held
only that race may not be the predominant factor in planning dis-
tricts."' That is also the current position of the Justice Department,
which is not planning on halting its scrutiny of legislative districting."'
Nonetheless, the Court in Miller has established one thing for certain:
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution applies to all peo-
ple-white and black alike. Whether it is an idea whose time has come,
or an idealistic notion with no grounding in reality, the Court, through its
recent opinions in the affirmative action and voting fields, continues to
press for a color-blind Constitution. In Adarand, Justice Scalia summa-
rized best the Court's view on how the state should view its citizenry: "In
the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American."38
SEAN SIMPSON
race of a voter corresponds to his party affiliation, racial and political gerrymanders
become indistinguishable. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2835, 2840-41 (1993) (White,
J., dissenting). The Shaw Court dismissed this contention, arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment demands a stricter scrutiny when classifications are based on race. Id. at
2828.
314. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2500 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 2488.
317. Reuben, supra note 228, at 19.
318. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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